In the run up to the 2014 European Parliament elections, the new Spitzenkandidaten process and European-wide party campaigns fuelled expectations of strengthening democratic processes in Europe. At the same time, the anticipated surge of support for anti-establishment and Eurosceptic parties caused concerns among political scientists. This paper summarises and critically reviews the contributions presented at the LEQS Annual Event "The 2014 EP Elections: A Victory for European Democracy?" held on the 2nd of June 2014, a week after the final European elections results were announced. The panel discussed the implications of election results for democracy in the European Union and its Member States.
Introduction
In May 2014 the 8 th European Parliament (EP) election was held across EU Member States. The election saw novel processes being put into place; the nomination of leading candidates, the Spitzenkandidaten, from European political groups for the post of Commission President, which included Europe-wide campaigning and televised debates between the party nominees. At the same time, the slight increase of voter turnout was encouraging, yet failed to offer convincing evidence in favour of the creation of a truly European demos, which can hold European decision-makers into account. Notably, the election results showed an increased support for anti- However, despite some pessimism over the low level of turnout, an overview of participation patterns across Member States in European and National contexts raises concerns about citizen participation throughout the continent.
It also stresses the need for further research in citizens' electoral behaviour in order to promote citizen involvement across political levels. Nevertheless, concerns regarding the institutional legitimacy of the European Parliament, and the EU in its entirety remained at the heart of presentations by all the panellists. Some novel ways to address this came up, such as a possible new mandate of scrutiny given to the EP, through increased communication and cooperation between the institution and National legislatures. Dr Sara Hagemann (LSE, European Institute) referred to this as a positive development, which could offer new avenues for increasing accountability and legitimacy across all political levels.
Further, in her presentation, Dr Sara Hagemann also discussed the impact of the election in the composition and operation of the next European Parliament. She highlighted in particular the possible formation of a political group along a Eurosceptic or far-right political dimension, and its implication for deliberative and legislative processes in the EP. Although these developments cannot be fully assessed at the moment, it is possible that the left-right dimension of political discussion that has prevailed at the European Parliament so far could be displaced by alternative dimensions, be it Eurosceptic versus pro-European or centre versus fringes.
In the second panel, Dr Mareike Kleine (LSE, European Institute) considered the ways in which Europe's leaders have responded to the EP election results and argued in favour of a strategy that will address the real sources of citizen frustration, instead of one that accommodates unhelpful populist narratives.
Her focus on substantial issues such as high unemployment levels, lack of economic growth and increasing inequality was shared by the other panellists. Certainly, favourable conditions make it easier for European democracy to flourish, yet the increasing financial differentials across the continent pose further challenges to the design of economic policy and call for ever more legitimation of the economic decision-making processes at the European level. Professor Iain Begg (LSE, European Institute) elaborated on this issue and outlined a number of new, real challenges to European democracy posed by swift and big changes in the balance of economic powers in the EU.
These are only some of the issues discussed during the panel presentations.
The remaining parts of this report elaborate on the arguments made and the discussion topics that followed. They also offer a critical presentation of the debate surrounding Mr Juncker's bid for Commission President, the legitimisation of EU decision-making processes demanded by the euro crisis and fiscal changes, as well as the transformation of the left-right dimension of political deliberation in the new European Parliament. Although a great part of the EU's democratic deficit debate relates to its structure and decision-making processes as a supranational organisation, a directly elected European Parliament would allow citizens to hold at least one European institution into account.
Electoral participation and EU legitimacy
Nevertheless, the growing powers granted to the European Parliament did not seem to convince more voters to come out and vote. While this year's election saw a stabilisation and marginal rise in voter turnout at 43.09%, the reading of this figure by the panel was predominantly negative. Professor
Fraser noted that at 43.09%, voter participation can hardly be considered the democratic surge many where hoping for to legitimise the increased decisionmaking taking place at the European level. Similarly, Dr Sara Hagemann pointed out that, given the prominence of the EU in the domestic political context of many Member States during the financial crisis and the many key economic policy decisions that took place, citizen participation in this election should have been much higher. At the same time, they both agreed that this year's European Parliament election was different, due to the Spitzenkandidaten nominated by the European party families for the post of Commission President, their campaigns across Europe and augmented media coverage, but that it failed to translate into increased participation.
The question of participation
So, how are we to interpret this modest turnout? Is it ominous for the legitimacy of the European Parliament and its efforts to play an even more active role in EU decision-making through the new selection process for the President of the Commission? Does it mean that the EU can no longer claim to rest on the passive consent of its citizens?
Professor Fraser noted in a later comment that a lot of the discussion around participation and turnout is predicated on our understanding of 'healthy democratic politics'. He argued that measuring the health of a democratic system through people's participation in processes they perceive as unlikely to have much impact on their lives, might not be a chimera. It was mentioned numerous times through the evening that the political issues dealt at the EU level have predominantly been of little interest to citizens, with the exception of Eurozone countries affected by the financial crisis. Hence, it is highly likely that ordinary citizens are infinitely more interested in their friends, families and jobs, than in political processes that they do not entirely understand.
Therefore, one could expect that unless the rights of people are not abused in a way to make them angry enough to protest, vote and participate, the choice of staying at home does not necessarily mean they are unsupportive of the electoral process. This comment by Professor Fraser raised the question of whether political scientists and analysts have set a very high standard of citizen hyperactivity in democratic politics, which may be unrealistic and even unnecessary. Yet, it did not stop evident disappointment over the level of electoral participation precisely because of the growing prominence of EU policy decisions in tackling the euro crisis.
In order to discuss about the best way to interpret voter turnout, it would be useful to look at the citizens that are engaging with the electoral process and coming out to vote. (Hagemann and Hix, 2009) . Country specific electoral laws could also help explain some of the low turnout in countries like Slovenia, and other underlying differences, such as the growing divide in participation between urban and rural areas, which often do not attract enough attention.
Therefore, if we wish to better understand European election results, it is important to study voting behaviour and underlying citizen attitudes. There are many questions that remain pressing, not least of which is the generational divide in participation or the aforementioned divide between capital and big cities and the rest of the country areas. Dr Hagemann noted that she is particularly worried about the level of engagement among the younger generation, which is particularly low given they have been socialised in and Hagemann argued that, firstly, the dominant party families of the centre are expected to be squeezed by this larger presence of fringe parties and may resort to forming large majorities across the middle in order to pass legislation. This means that the left-right dynamic is likely to be less dominant in negotiations and policy agreements, compared to previous parliaments.
Legislative outputs must also be less bold or more watered-down, if they are to attract broad consensus from all centre groups.
Apart from the effect of the squeezed middle, Dr Hagemann believes that the presence of this considerable number of MEPs in the far right fringe is expected to shift the political dynamics from a left-right dimension to a more explicit discourse of 'insiders' versus 'outsiders'. Despite the campaigning attempts of European party families and the Spitzenkandidaten to debate along a left-right political dimension, election results have given rise to a Parliament were the question of the EU itself is likely to be a main point of debate.
Professor Iain Begg later agreed on that point, stating that he expected to see at least a two-dimensional matrix, where the pro-European and Eurosceptic dimension will be as -or even more -visible as the traditional left-right political spectrum. However, the degree of its visibility will depend on two key points. Dr Hagemann notes that the important questions surrounding fringe parties following the EP election is whether they will form a political group in the European Parliament and whether they will participate or boycott legislative procedures.
The first point relates to the institutional requirements for forming a political group in the Parliament, which demands the presence of 25 MEPs from at least one-quarter of Member States. The numerical requirement of MEPs can be easily satisfied, although at the moment it is uncertain whether parties from 7 Member States will manage to come together and agree on a common political platform. If fringe parties do organise themselves in a political group, they are expected to receive important material and procedural benefits, from financial funds for support staff and office space to committee leadership appointments and speaking time. Dr Hagemann noted that these two points,
which are yet to fully play out, are extremely important for democratic representation in the European Parliament, its deliberative process and legislative output. She pointed out that although the European Parliament is meant to be a forum for ideas and debate, inactivity or intense disharmony among its members could be damaging for its legislative mandate and its efforts to engage in negotiations with the governments of Member States and other EU institutions. Potentially, an additional layer of checks and balances could be created, benefiting National and European political processes. Therefore, in her conclusion, Dr Hagemann was optimistic about the increasing visibility and importance of the European Parliament as an institution, but worried about the implications that fringe parties will have for its developing role and its legislative processes.
Discussion
The increased communication between members of national legislatures with members and committees of the European Parliament could be seen as an encouraging development for political accountability. It could potentially also provide a missing level of scrutiny of the decisions taken by National leaders at the European level, which currently adds to the democratic deficit of the EU system. The need for additional scrutiny and accountability was highlighted by Professor Begg in his presentation of the increasing democratic challenges for the EU and will be elaborated further in the discussion part of this paper.
Another important point to take from Dr Hagemann's address is that this positive development for increased cooperation among the two political levels could be adversely affected by the changes in political representation in the new European Parliament. Dr Hagemann described the change in political dynamics to one of 'insiders' versus 'outsiders', while Professor Begg opted for the terms pro-European and Eurosceptic and Professor Fraser for the 'centre' versus 'fringes'. However, despite the obvious surge in representation at the right fringe of the political spectrum, it is difficult to see how such different parties, ascribing to different values and different goals, could come together to form a coherent political group. In his speech, Professor Begg mentioned some of the many differences between Eurosceptic parties, ranging from UKIP's stance against immigration and anti-Brussels sentiments, to anti-globalisation rhetoric in France and euro-currency scepticism in Germany. Apart from some form of criticism of the EU, there is limited common ground among such parties. In fact, Professor Begg noted that political parties on the right fringe appear rather suspicious of each other and initial contact between party leaders in an effort to form a European political group has frequently lead to impasses. It has been reported, for example, that the Front National is keen to communicate with UKIP, but would not accept to be on the same platform as Jobick from Hungary or the Golden Dawn from Greece. UKIP on the other hand, is so far unwilling to stand side by side with the Front National, but would be keen to connect with the Beppe Grillo's M5S in Italy, which represents a protest anti-establishment party. Therefore, it remains to be seen how this Eurosceptic end of a new political dimension will be played out, or if in fact it will be played out as such at all. The evident discord among the parties represented shows it would not be easy to agree on a common platform and create a European political group that will vote cohesively or block legislation.
The response of European political leaders to EP results

Dr Mareike Kleine Associate professor in EU and international politics European Institute, LSE
In her address, Dr Mareike Kleine focused on the possible course of action for European leaders following citizens' voting in the May election. The interpretation of election results as an alarm bell for European leaders, who should "wake up" and "listen to citizens' wishes" has been popular among the press, especially in the UK. However Dr Kleine remains unconvinced that this is the best approach and offers an alternative that involves addressing the issues that underlie citizen's frustration.
Going back to the traditional political science understanding of voters as 'rationally ignorant', Dr Kleine firstly highlighted the considerable weariness with which most citizens approach European Politics. With the exception of Eurozone countries being affected by the financial crisis, she argued that for most citizens the EU hardly ever deals with policy that is relevant and accessible to them, such as health, education or social services. In fact, she finds that the consensual basis of European political processes is -for lack of a better term -quite boring for most European citizens, who are more familiar with the antagonistic political discourse found at the National levels. In addition, most European citizens have limited knowledge and interest in EU institutions. Hence, Dr Kleine argues that it would be wiser to interpret results based on the 'rationally ignorant voter' model, where citizens perceive the cost of informing themselves fully and accurately about European Parliament election choices to outweigh the potential benefits that knowledge would provide (Downs, 1957) . It follows that in an election with limited apprehension and interest, voters who have no strong preferences will tend to stay home, while those who care significantly about certain issues will cast their vote. This helps boost the performance of single-issue parties or, for that matter, fringe parties. In this framework, Dr. Finally, Dr Kleine proposed a third course of action for European leaders: to actively focus on addressing the reasons for citizen frustration by promoting policy programs aimed at sustainable economic growth, economic stability, employment and less social and wealth inequality. In the case of southern European countries in austerity programs, the EU should revise the requirements, loosen budgetary constraints and give some breathing space to these countries, in order to alleviate the social and economic effects of the crisis. Her proposal implies that there is not a single common lesson that can be drawn from the latest European Election and hence no prescribed course of action that is common for all political leaders. Dr Kleine notes that each national context differs considerably, both in its financial indicators, economic performance and primary concerns of its citizens. Even in Member States restricted by memoranda attached to bail out packages, reasons for citizen frustration and effective responses to underlying problems still vary. She argues that every country should take its own lesson from the EP election results and focus on ways that will truly address its citizen's problems.
Discussion
Dr Kleine's proposal for European political leaders to focus on the underlying issues that have fuelled citizens' frustration is refreshing and simple in theory (although it might prove to be much more complex to implement). By tackling the genuine problems expressed through the electoral process, political leaders can show they are truly "listening to voters". Antiestablishment or extreme right parties most often do not offer any political proposals that are constructive in nature. For example, the M5S in Italy has been criticised for its lack of action in the Italian legislature and its inability to contribute to the political changes the country needs. Parties of the extreme right, such as Golden Dawn in Greece, espouse values that irreconcilable with cooperation, democracy and inclusion, and hence, cannot make proposals to promote democratic politics. Finally, parties such as UKIP in the UK referred to by Dr Kleine, have resorted to populist statements that are not based on rigorous analysis and could have adverse effects for the country. In fact, in the case of the UK, recent studies show that the net effect of immigration on GDP is negligible, while both optimistic and pessimistic financial scenarios following a British exit from the EU would lead to a drop in GDP. can facilitate a more adversarial political system, closer to the one operating at the National level of many Member States, which could potentially make EU politics more interesting and lead to increased citizen engagement, but could you can read the briefing paper from Migration Watch http://www.migrationwatchuk.org/briefingPaper/document/235, and the Home Office report https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/287287/occ1 09.pdf. also challenge the fundamental principles of inclusiveness and consensus, on which the EU has so far been based. This may turn out to be a true dilemma for the future of European politics. Certainly, increased politicisation of EU institutions does not necessarily constitute politicisation along national lines, but this is a conceivable outcome that both Europe's leaders and political scientists need to consider. The current discussion on Mr Juncker's candidacy for Commission President and the stern position of certain European leaders against this already involves traces of arguments along national lines. His main concern is that the extension of the ECB's mandate is proceeding without much notice and informed debate regarding the possible implications and its future role. Similarly, he finds that talks about a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union (GEMU) that surfaced in 2012 present a vision for Europe that is unclear, and miss concrete details and discussion. With a lack of information and the absence of a common agreement on what GEMU should try to achieve, these developments represent a real challenge to the way democracy operates at the EU level. Finally, he agreed with Dr Mereike Kleine that the core problem facing Europe today remains its high unemployment, lack of economic growth and growth disparities. He argued that although the democracy question is tangential in the way these problems have arisen, efforts to tackle them through institutional and policy changes will entail fundamental democratic choices and challenges, given the current level of economic integration in the EU.
The new and real challenges for European democracy Professor Iain Begg Professorial Research Fellow, European Institute, LSE
Discussion
Professor Begg's talk on the new democratic challenges that have emerged due to the increased powers given to EU institutions, especially the ECB, during the financial crisis highlights the need for further discussion about the ways these changes can be legitimised democratically or reversed. It has been argued that the euro crisis exposed the limitations of the previous economic and political system, which lacked enforcement and comprehensive supervision of Member States' finances. It seems that Professor Begg's fears concern more the lack of debate and analysis of the democratic implications of these developments, than the specific measures taken to combat the crisis per se. In fact, the Troika committees have profoundly changed the way democracy operates in the Member States that received bailout packages, with the marginalisation of National legislative processes and their substitution by an approval mechanism. The creation of protest parties or political groups and the power imbalances in national party systems in Italy, Spain and Greece are also partly related to the ways in which democracy has been transformed in these countries. The assessment of the particular methods the European Commission, the ECB and IMF employed to combat the crisis certainly requires lengthy analysis and is likely to preoccupy political scientists for years to come. Yet apart from this assessment, it is also very important that enforcement of these decisions, as well as their immediate and potential implications for democracy, is transparent and visible to all European citizens.
The speakers touched upon a number of issues concerning the state of While the panel loosely agreed that the Lisbon Treaty changes have given some legitimate claim for the leading candidate of the wining political group to be nominated, Professor Fraser questioned whether the low level of participation and the fact that voters in certain parts of the EU did not have the opportunity to vote for a party in support of Mr Juncker delegitimises this selection process. Returning to the earlier discussion on the implications of suppressed turnout on the democratic claim of European institutions, again it seems that delegitimising the electoral process is not the most productive approach to the problem of low participation. It would be better to focus on attempts to increase mobilization and bring out centrist voters (that is, assuming centre voters fail to turn out) than to question the legitimacy of the electoral result. In regards to the second argument, it is important to note that consultation did take place in the candidate selection process within political groups at the level of the European Parliament. The European Conservatives and Reformists group (ECR), which was formed by the Conservative party, being against the Spitzenkandidaten process from the outset chose not to propose a candidate and this was the choice made available to voters at home. Therefore, it doesn't seem that there are strong grounds to question the democratic legitimacy of the Spitzenkandidaten result.
In fact, as one member of the audience noted, even attempting to infer which voters chose Mr Juncker, directly or indirectly, or how many of the voters who stayed at home would implicitly support Juncker by virtue of being centrist voters, is not a straightforward exercise. A more candid approach would be to consider the message that will be sent to the 43.09% of European voters who participated in the election, and hence must believe there is some value in the European electoral process. In addition, disregarding the 
Legitimacy at the EU level is needed more than ever before
With the increasing politicisation of EU institutions and changes necessitated by the economic crisis, the question of how to address sluggish growth and high unemployment that both Professor Begg and Dr Kleine identified in their speeches is pressing. Referring to the issue of economic differentials among Member States, a member of the audience accurately pointed out that there is no political system that can generate uninterrupted growth, and that even in long periods of sustained growth there will always be regional and sectorial differences. In other words, every political system needs to make policy choices that will have varied implications for different areas. What does that mean for European democracy? Essentially, it means that given increased economic integration there are now much greater legitimacy requirements on the EU system to justify such differentials. Professor Begg added that although every type of policy has some distributive outcome, fiscal policy is fundamentally distributive and cannot be assigned to technocratic deliberation as easily as, for example, environmental policy. What could be a possible response to these challenges? In the case of fiscal and monetary policy, Dr Kleine suggested that it will be extremely hard for the European Parliament to ever compensate for the amount of economic powers and legitimacy transferred from the National level to Brussels. Hence, she is in favour of a decentralisation and devolution of economic competence as the best way to remedy this deficit. However, it is difficult to draw a line on the optimal level of integration or decentralisation of economic competencies, as was exposed by the euro crisis. Maintaining the common currency and at the same time protecting the monetary system from future crises and financial problems of contagion between members would necessitate more coordination. Although it is still difficult to outline with precision the type of cooperation needed between National and European Parliament committees, it is evident that National Parliaments cannot oversee decision-making processes at the European levels as well as at the National one. The speed and breadth of European integration requires true parliamentary scrutiny at both levels. Dr Hagemann's current research is looking at the way in which different National parliamentary setups promote involvement and coordination at the EU level, in an effort to identify best practices across borders. Devising a blueprint for National Parliaments' role in an effort to enhance popular legitimacy of decision-making would be an important step for European democracy. Similarly, grouping all professed Eurosceptic parties together gives rise to a considerably incoherent group, which is difficult to analyse. A visual matrix compiled by Think Tank Counterpoint prior to the election to capture the democratic challenges posed by populist parties on the European level highlights the various different profiles of fringe parties (see Table 2 below). With these differences in mind, agreement on a common platform and formation of a political group among fringe parties should remain a challenge. Even if a loose block is formed based on Eurosceptic principles, it is still possible that voting cohesiveness among its MEPs will be low, as in the case of the anti-integration European Freedom and Democracy (EFD) political group during the previous EP sitting ( Morris, 2013) . At present it is difficult to see along what dimension these political parties will choose to operate, whether it will be pro-European versus Eurosceptic, centre versus extreme right, insiders versus outsiders, or simply along individual party lines and key national concerns. Nevertheless, political processes in the European Parliament are expected to be affected by the presence of such fringe parties. As discussed by Dr Hagemann, if fringe parties do attempt to vote as a block, this may result in watered-down legislation that will require support by all the 'centre' or 'insider' parties. This, in itself, is a significant implication for European democracy. Furthermore, this is a challenge that also applies for democratic processes at the National level. In most Member States the difference between the centre-left and the centre-right is diminishing, whether due to globalisation forces or due to imposed policy programs from the Troika committees, which has led to strong pressures on the mainstream parties of the centre. The rise of some anti-systemic and extreme right parties of European Member States has occurred as much on the local and National level, as on the European one. As Professor Fraser pointed out in a later comment, the overall implication of a broad consensus among the right and left parties across the political centre is that left-right politics will be played out between the far left and the far right, or the centre and the fringes. States and each national party system entails distinct party profiles. However, previous research into MEPs' voting patterns has shown that most political groups in the European Parliament tend to vote cohesively, suggesting that MEPs have managed to find common ground on the basis of this traditional political dimension (Hix, Noury and Roland, 2005) . It remains to be seen whether the new composition of the European Parliament will challenge this. 
